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Abstrak 
Memeriksa paket untuk mengesan pencerobohan berhadapan cabaran apabila 
berlakunya jumlah trafik rangkaian yang tinggi. Proses pengesanan berdasarkan paket 
bagi setiap muat beban pada wayar mengurangkan prestasi sistem pengesanan 
pencerobohan rangkaian (NIDS). Isu ini memerlukan kepada satu pengenalan NIDS 
berasaskan aliran untuk mengurangkan jumlah data yang akan diproses dengan 
memeriksa agregat maklumat dari paket yang berkaitan. Walau bagaimanapun, 
pengesanan berdasarkan aliran masih mengalami penjanaan amaran positif palsu 
kerana input data yang tidak lengkap. Kajian ini mencadangkan Pengesanan 
Pencerobohan Hibrid Bersyarat (CHID) dengan mencantumkan pengesanan 
berasaskan aliran dengan pengesanan berasaskan paket. Tambahan lagi, ia juga 
bertujuan untuk memperbaiki penggunaan sumber pendekatan pengesanan berasaskan 
paket. CHID menggunakan algoritma penilaian ciri pembalut atribut yang 
menandakan aliran hasad untuk analisis selanjutnya oleh pengesanan berasaskan 
paket. Pendekatan Rangka Kerja Input telah digunakan untuk mencetus aliran paket 
diantara pengesanan berasaskan paket dan berasaskan aliran. Eksperimen tapak 
ujiterkawal telah dijalankan untuk menilai prestasi mekanisme pengesanan CHID 
menggunakan set data yang diperolehi daripada pada kadar trafik yang berbeza. Hasil 
penilaian didapati CHID memperoleh peningkatan prestasi yang ketara dari segi 
penggunaan sumber dan kadar paket susut, berbanding pelaksanaan pengesanan 
berasaskan paket lalai. Pada kelajuan 200 Mbps, CHID dalam senario IRC-bot, boleh 
mengurangkan 50.6% dari penggunaan memori dan menyusut 18.1% penggunaan 
CPU tanpa paket susut. Pendekatan CHID boleh mengurangkan kadar positif palsu 
berdasarkan pengesanan berasaskan aliran dan mengurangkan penggunaan sumber 
pengesanan berasaskan paket disamping memelihara ketepatan pengesanan. 
Pendekatan CHID boleh dianggap sebagai sistem generik untuk diaplikasikan untuk 
sistem pemantauan pengesanan pencerobohan. 
 
Kata Kunci: Pengesanan berasaskan aliran, Pengesanan berasaskan paket, Bro-NIDS, 
Rangka kerja input. 
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Abstract 
Inspecting packets to detect intrusions faces challenges when coping with a high 
volume of network traffic. Packet-based detection processes every payload on the 
wire, which degrades the performance of network intrusion detection system (NIDS). 
This issue requires an introduction of a flow-based NIDS that reduces the amount of 
data to be processed by examining aggregated information of related packets. 
However, flow-based detection still suffers from the generation of the false positive 
alerts due to incomplete data input. This study proposed a Conditional Hybrid 
Intrusion Detection (CHID) by combining the flow-based with packet-based detection. 
In addition, it is also aimed to improve the resource consumption of the packet-based 
detection approach. CHID applied attribute wrapper features evaluation algorithms 
that marked malicious flows for further analysis by the packet-based detection. Input 
Framework approach was employed for triggering packet flows between the packet-
based and flow-based detections. A controlled testbed experiment was conducted to 
evaluate the performance of detection mechanism’s CHID using datasets obtained 
from on different traffic rates. The result of the evaluation showed that CHID gains a 
significant performance improvement in terms of resource consumption and packet 
drop rate, compared to the default packet-based detection implementation. At a 200 
Mbps, CHID in IRC-bot scenario, can reduce 50.6% of memory usage and decreases 
18.1% of the CPU utilization without packets drop. CHID approach can mitigate the 
false positive rate of flow-based detection and reduce the resource consumption of 
packet-based detection while preserving detection accuracy. CHID approach can be 
considered as generic system to be applied for monitoring of intrusion detection 
systems. 
 
Keywords: Flow-based detection, Packet-based detection, Input Framework 
approach. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The number of Internet clients and services is growing more and more [1]. New 
Internet applications give users benefits for either their businesses or future life. The 
Internet is a powerful medium that has changed how people communicate and do 
businesses with the partners. These universal applications let companies achieve 
things that never been imagined before. 
In addition to growing of the Internet users, networks become bigger and bigger. 
Although the Internet gives users’ bright life and good businesses, it also has its 
unknown dark face. Since many new Internet services, devices, and hosts are 
developing, the number of vulnerabilities either in user smartphones, computers or 
servers is also increasing [2]. The more computers connected to the Internet the more 
possibility that the attacks take place. Many security gaps are exposed and misused by 
attacks. Unfortunately, attacks are growing with the Internet almost in parallel, and 
the race between them is continuing.  
The number and the damage cost by those attacks are rising continuously. The security 
threats can exploit all types of the network, including LAN-based clusters, intranet, 
large-scale computational grids, and peer-to-peer service networks. These threats also 
exploit all exposed protocols and operating systems (OS) threatening different kinds 
of their applications such as database and web servers. Considering the damage cost 
originated from the attacks, it is important to detect an attack as soon as possible. The 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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Appendix A 
Attack Classification 
In the literature, many attack classifications and taxonomies have been presented and 
surveyed. However, not all the taxonomies that outlined in the literature provide the 
same classification. Some studies classify the attack based on their goals, results, and 
tools [28] and others classify the attacks based on the network type [206]. The highest 
priority attacks are those who have a critical impact on the computer system. In this 
appendix, the following major types of attacks are described. 
A.1 Denial of Service (DoS) 
The main objective of DoS attacks is to deny a legitimate user from using or accessing 
his/her system in a normal mode. It often disturbs the service of a computer, a server, 
or a network. Thus it is impossible to use its resources. This kind of attack is frequent 
on the Internet. There are three types of Dos attacks: host based, network based, and 
distributed based. 
Host-based DoS attacks: This attack targets a vulnerability in the operating system, 
application software, CPU, and memory. The main aim of this attack is to crash the 
host. It also works by exploiting the implementation of network protocols  
Network based DoS attacks: Network resources are targeted in this attack by 
flooding the network with packets to disrupt legitimate use. In this case, the bandwidth 
is overwhelmed with packets so that there is no left bandwidth for the legitimate users. 
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TCP floods, ICMP floods, and UDP floods are the most network based DoS attack 
identified that stream their packets to the target.  
Distributed based DoS or DDoS attacks: This attack use a large number of attacked 
computers to direct coordinated DoS attack against target or targets.  
A.2 Information Gathering and Scanning 
These attacks try to gather information about the system for further attacks. No actual 
attack is launched on the computer and the network; they are, however, sniffed, 
scanned, and probed. A packet sniffer is a simple tool to gather information about 
computer and network by listening to every packet at a particular point in a network. 
In conventional packet sniffer, the attacker set the Ethernet card into promiscuous 
mode so that the card accepts and read all traffic packets in the network, even when a 
packet is not addressed to this network card.  MAC address, IP addresses, and running 
services for a particular host can be obtained using sniffer tools.  
A.3 Malicious Software 
Malware includes Worms, Virus and Trojan horse, are malicious programs that are 
inserted into a host to corrupt a system, deny access to a service. The worm runs 
random code on the victim’s host and installs copies of itself in the memory, which 
infects other hosts on the network. It leads to network congestion, delay, and loss 
packets. A virus is a program that is attached to another program to run a particular 
harmful function on the victim’s computer. The virus needs the user interaction to run 
it and propagate to other files or hosts. However, the spread of worms is extremely 
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faster than the virus. A Trajan horse is a program looks like a useful application, but 
in fact, performs unwanted actions such as controlling the victim's host remotely using 
backdoor installation. 
A.4 IP Spoofing 
This kind of attack is functioning on networks and TPC/IP protocols. Network 
spoofing is used when the attacker pretends himself as a legitimate user by spoofing 
who they are. Session Hijacking is the most popular attack in this kind of attack. The 
attacker usually takes over a session between two hosts and then cuts one of these 
hosts to be replaced by him. Session Hijacking usually operates at TCP layer and is 
used to take over sessions of services such as FTP and Telnet. TCP session hijacking 
also takes advantage of using IP spoofing and TCP sequence number. To make this 
attack easy to the attacker, the attacker has to guess the TCP sequence number of the 
session that is attempted to be hijacked by capturing and analysing the packets 
travelling between the two victims. After the attackers manage to get the sequence 
number, they spoof their IP address to be matched with one of the victim hosts and 
then send a TCP packet to the other host with the hijacked sequence number. When 
the other host accepts the packet and verifies the sequence number which is correct, 
this host starts to reply to the attacker and continue the hijacked session. 
Other types of attacks may include: 
 Physical attacks: The aim of this attack is to damage the computer hardware 
and network devices. 
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 Buffer overflows: This attack overflow the process’s buffer of the victim’s 
system to damage the process.  
 Password attacks: This attack involves when the attacker is attempting to 
guess a password of a protected host. Password dictionary and brute force are 
the main example of this attack. 
 Botnet attack: This attack was discussed in Chapter 4. 
The following steps explain the nature and the methodology of the computer attacks 
[207]: 
1. Reconnaissance: This step involves the process when the attacker collects 
information about its victim, including the network infrastructure, before 
launching its attack.  
2. Scanning: In this stage, the attacker starts to look for vulnerabilities and holes 
by scanning the victim’s system. Towards the end, the attacker can obtain 
precious information such as network topology, IP addresses of live hosts, 
open port numbers, and security devices rules.  
3. Getting Access: This step takes place when the attacker attempt to gain access 
either using the operating system and application attacks if the attacker is a 
legitimate user, or using the network if the attacker is an outsider. 
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4. Retaining Access: After the attacker gained access to the compromised host, 
he/she has to maintain this access. Trajan horse and Backdoors are the famous 
techniques to perform this step.  
5. Hiding Imprint: When the attackers have achieved what they want, they should 
not leave any track on the system. Backdoor and RootKit are among techniques 
that help the attacker to modify system logs and build hidden channel for data 
transmission. 
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Appendix B 
NIDS Requirements 
There are many requirements for efficient NIDS mentioned in the literature [6]. The 
main two requirements that attracted researchers currently are scalability and detection 
accuracy.  
 Scalability: NIDS should operate in large volume networks without resource 
consumption. This happens when all potential packets and traffic are analysed 
without packet loss. Thus, detection analysis should be performed smoothly in 
a large data network as well as with increase traffic and network’s size. Also, 
the data amount to be processed by detection methods should be as small as 
possible. Note that the term “potential packet” is used instead of “incoming 
packet”, this is because potential packets are extracted after sampling 
processes as will be discussed later. 
 Detecting accuracy or detection rate: beside all potential packets should be 
processed correctly; detection methods have to make the right decision, not to 
decide falsely. To achieve this requirement, the true-positive rate should be 
high while fewer false positive and negative rate. 
Other requirements of NIDS may include: 
 Detecting unknown attacks: novel intrusion should be detected 
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 Detecting encrypted traffic: encrypted payloads should be readable and 
analysed for intrusion detection. 
 Early detection: intrusion should be detected as soon as possible 
 Large data storage: all potential signatures, profiles, alerts, and reports 
should be stored for long-term and further usage. 
 NIDS security: NIDS should be secured enough against attackers who direct 
attacks into the NIDS itself. 
 Events correlation: For distributed attacks, NIDS should correlate single 
attack event with other resources such as firewall, routers or other NIDS for 
detection.  
 IPv6 compatibility: NIDS should support IPv4 and IPv6 
 Success attacks identification: NIDS should differentiate between successful 
and unsuccessful attack so that the operator should take a proper action against 
them. 
 Privacy: NIDS should not violate privacy regulation of users by inspecting 
private information both in payload and header of the packets. 
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 Attack classification: After detection, NIDS should also identify and classify 
attacks. Each attack has to be labelled and be under a category for further 
analysis and measurements. 
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Appendix C 
Attacks Detectable by Flow-based Approach 
This appendix presents the attacks that are detectable by flow-based NIDS and how 
the current research community handles its limitation. 
DoS Attack 
Gao, et al. [208] proposed and implemented a DoS resilient High-speed Flow-level 
Intrusion Detection system, HiFIND. The authors developed a prototype that accepts 
flows exported from a Netflow router in real time. Their approach handles the problem 
of DoS using flow aggregation accounted in data stream called a sketch. A sketch is a 
hash table in one-dimension appropriated for quick storage of information. Sketch 
counts incidences of an event and studies how the traffic behaves over a period of time 
using statistics. It stores values that help an anomaly-based engine to trigger alarms 
based on a statistical forecast. So an abnormal deviation from this forecast values is 
detected as an intrusion. SYN flooding attack is one of DoS attacks that can be used 
by sketch to detect this type of attack with the following steps: 
 The sketch stores and calculates the difference between the number of SYN 
packets and the number of SYN/ACK packets of each flow. 
 If this difference is not within the normal range, a DoS SYN flooding attack is 
detected. 
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This approach can be implemented with relying on packet headers only instead of 
flows but, however; data reduction which is provided by flows cannot be achieved.  
Zhao, et al. [53] proposed and designed data streaming algorithms that can detect super 
sources and super destinations attacks. Super source happens when a source or a host 
has a unusual number of outgoing connection (fan-out) within specified period. An 
example of the super source is port scanning that searches for vulnerable services 
among different hosts. Super destination is considered when a destination or a host 
receive abnormal number of incoming connection attempts within a small time 
interval (fan-in). Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is an example of super 
destination when a large number of hosts flood flows to a single destination. Data 
streaming algorithms used in their work is to identify flows that have an unusual 
number of connection after filtering part of the traffic. Unlike [208], the algorithms of 
used in [53] is based on two dimension hash tables. To reduce the amount of data to 
be processed, they perform flow sampling algorithm, hence improving the speed of 
the process. Since not all the flows are processed, data reduction may compromise the 
accuracy. The authors solve this problem by combining the power of data streaming 
and sampling. 
Kim, et al. [40] presented a detecting method for detecting abnormal network traffic 
by analysing the traffic based on flows only. They use the term “traffic pattern” to 
express different types of DoS attacks. A traffic pattern is a signature that describes 
the number of flows, number of packets per flow, the size of flow, the size of packets, 
and the total bandwidth occupied during the session. The authors use these patterns to 
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differentiate between instances when detecting scanning or flooding attacks. For 
example, during scanning or SYN flooding attack, since the attacker makes many 
connection attempts, this pattern can be detected because of:  
 a large number of flows generated since the attacker sends many packets to the 
victim,  
 a small number of packets per flow,  
 moreover, the small size of the packet as the attacker sends small SYN packets. 
The authors also managed to detect ICMP and UDP flooding attack. These attacks 
have dynamic traffic patterns since it depends on the number of packets and hosts used 
in these attacks. However, these attacks can be detected since they create large 
bandwidth consumption and a high number of packets. Their approach can detect 
traffic of different attacks with a similar traffic pattern by identifying their metrics and 
then formalizing them into one detection function. However, certain attacks cannot be 
observed using their method since Kim, et al. focused on detecting DoS and DDoS 
attacks only. Since they used static threshold values of their parameters in the detection 
function, their method cannot be suitable for every network condition. So, the adaptive 
threshold for various network environments is required. 
Munz and Carle [57] proposed a general system for DoS flow-based detection named 
“TOPAS” (Traffic flOw Packet Analysis System). This system operates as a flow 
collector from multiple sources. It receives data to be analysed in real-time. The 
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authors develop TOPAS so that it supports different kinds of DoS detection modules 
and it is publicly available. These modules are including SYN flood detection, Web 
Server overloading module using HTTP request, and traceback module that identifies 
the entry points of attack packet with spoofed source IP address. These modules can 
be adjusted by the network administrator to increase the detection opportunities and 
accuracy. An example of this is adjusting the number of SYN and SYN/ACK packets 
in case of SYN flooding detection module. Although the authors state that TOPAS can 
also analyse packet-base data, their approach does not support the combination of 
packet-based and flow-based to reduce the false alarms. 
Worms 
Worm mechanism such as Code Red usually has two stages: victim discovery and 
transfer code. In discovery stage, the worm surveys the network to find vulnerable 
holes in the systems while in transfer stage, the worm starts to spread the code to the 
systems. Unfortunately, the second stage cannot be detected using the flow-based 
system since the code is injected in the payload which is not analysed by the flow-
based. Thus only the first stage of worm behaviour can be analysed and detected using 
flow-based approach. Some attributes on the hosts when worms infect them are used 
to detect worms attack. Such attributes include the number of connections, ratio of 
outgoing to incoming traffic, and response way. However, some researchers deal with 
worm detection the same way when dealing with scanning detection since they have 
some common characteristics. DoS detection methods achieved by [53, 208] can be 
used to detect the worm.  
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Diibendorfer and Plattner [209] proposed a near real-time method for outbreak worm 
detection in high-speed networks using flow-based approach. The method is based on 
examination the behaviour and the number of incomings and outgoing connection of 
the host. For detection method, the authors used the host behaviour and characteristics 
to classify hosts into three classes: traffic class, connector class, and responder class. 
Only suspicious hosts belong to these classes.  
Hosts are classified as traffic class when the amount of traffic sent from the host is 
more than received. An example of this is the worms send out exploit code or when 
the worm spread in email attachments. Hosts that initiate an abnormal high number of 
outgoing connections are classified under connector class. Such class happens when 
hosts scan others. Responder class involves when a host holds bidirectional 
connections such as TCP connection. An example of this class is when the host 
responds to TCP handshake initiation or scan during a worm outbreak. In their 
approach, overlapping within these classes is possible, meaning that a host can be 
belonging to more than one class.  
Figure C.1 illustrate this overlap. Worm outbreak attack can be detected by tracking 
the cardinality of each class of an entire network periodically. Thus, any unexpected 
or sudden changes in the cardinality of one or more classes are detected as worm 
outbreak. The authors validate their method by tracing archived flow-level of recent 
Internet emails and by tracing fast spreading worms such as Blaster. 
Abdulla, et al. [85] proposed a worm warning system using IP flow and machine 
learning approach. The authors consider the case that when a host is infected by an 
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email worm or scanning, an unusual amount of traffic is initiated. This traffic is not 
relied on DNS. They classify flow-based records using Support Vector Machine 
(SVM) to extract features that belong to worm attacks. For training SVM, the features 
are gathered into a set of patterns. The authors propose a structure that consists of three 
modules: data collecting, data sampling, and classifier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.1. Classes of Host Behaviour for Worm Detection 
The first module collects the raw traffic and extracts the flow record information and 
stores them into a database. The authors address the problem of dealing with a large 
amount of flow data by creating the data sampling module. The classifier module 
classifies the sampled traffic into a worm and benign flow. The SVM was trained by 
the following scanning worms: CodeRed, Slammer, Doomjuice, and Witty. For email 
worms, it was trained by sobig, Netsky, Storm, MyDoom, and Conficker. 
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SSH 
Secure SHell (SSH) is a communication protocol that allows a user to have full control 
over a host’s resources remotely. Thus, hosts with SSH-enabled are unfortunately 
targeted by intrusions. Sperotto, et al. [210] have studied and analysed the flow traffic 
during SSH. They extract the flow data that is suspected to be malicious traffic. The 
authors then develop a model which presents the flow characteristics when SSH 
intrusion takes place. Although their model can detect these attacks, however, the 
possibility of this model to be in practice is still unknown. Based on their work, 
Hellemons (2012) develop an algorithm to test the practical applicability of the SSH 
intrusion model. The algorithm uses the processed flow data to construct attack 
metadata in the form of properties. Hellemons answered the question: “Can SSH 
intrusion attacks be detected and analysed in practice by using only flow data?” 
affirmatively. This method reduces the need for deep packet inspection system, 
allowing for more scalable NIDS solution. 
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Appendix D 
Main Bro Log Files 
D.1 Connection.log 
Bro generates this log during run time. It consists of the complete connection log of 
incoming and outgoing traffic. Table D.1 shows the fields of the connection.log file. 
Table D.1 
 
Fields Description of Connection.log file 
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D.2 Signatures.log 
This is log is generated when content matching occurs. Bro raises an event with the 
alert named. This log also contains the payload content which triggers this event. Table 
D.2 shows each field with its description for this log. 
Table D.2 
 
Fields Description of Signatures.log file 
 
The following log text is a sample of Signatuers.log generated from PH when CTU-
52 dataset is used. It shows three infected IRC-bot were detected: 147.32.84.165, 
147.32.84.191, and 147.32.84.192  
#separator \x09 
#set_separator , 
#empty_field (empty) 
#unset_field - 
#path signatures 
#open 2015-08-01-08-13-34 
#fields ts uid src_addr src_port dst_addr dst_port
 note sig_id event_msg sub_msg sig_count host_count 
#types time string addr port addr port enum string string string
 count count 
1313675274.978894 CoX6Zn4wnPAUOfTuOk 147.32.84.165 1027 74.125.232.201 80
 Signatures::Sensitive_Signature ircattack_client 147.32.84.165: 
signature match GET /service/check2?appid=%7B430FD4D0-B729-4F61-AA34-
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91526481799D%7D&appversion=1.3.21.65&applang=&machine=0&version=1.3.21.65&osversion=5
.1... - - 
1313675281.195719 CxIZuw1HkEATGTlkL6 147.32.84.191 1027 74.125.232.200 80
 Signatures::Sensitive_Signature ircattack_client 147.32.84.191: 
signature match GET /service/check2?appid=%7B430FD4D0-B729-4F61-AA34-
91526481799D%7D&appversion=1.3.21.65&applang=&machine=0&version=1.3.21.65&osversion=5
.1... - - 
1313675284.530430 CPfunv1ZCWV1ZnfWBj 147.32.84.192 1027 74.125.232.199 80
 Signatures::Sensitive_Signature ircattack_client 147.32.84.192: 
signature match GET /service/check2?appid=%7B430FD4D0-B729-4F61-AA34-
91526481799D%7D&appversion=1.3.21.65&applang=&machine=0&version=1.3.21.65&osversion=5
.1... - - 
#close 2015-08-01-08-13-48 
 
 
 
D.3 Notice.log 
Bro also generates this log at runtime. In this log, it contains activities that Bro 
recognizes as interesting or bad. Table D.3 shows the filed description of this log. 
Table D.3 
 
Fields Description of Notice.log file 
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Appendix E 
Resource Consumptions Results 
 
Figure E.1. CPU Usage over Time at 100 Mbps – P2P-bot 
 
Figure E.2. Memory Usage over Time at 100 Mbps – P2P-bot 
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Figure E.3. CPU Usage over Time at 200 Mbps- P2P-bot 
 
 
Figure E.4. Memory Usage over Time at 200 Mbps – P2P-bot 
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Figure E.5. CPU Usage over Time at 500 Mbps – P2P-bot 
 
 
Figure E.6. Memory Usage over Time at 500 Mbps – P2P-bot 
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Figure E.7. CPU Usage over Time at 1000 Mbps – P2P-bot 
 
Figure E.8. Memory Usage over Time at 1000 Mbps – P2P-bot 
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Appendix F 
Samples of Detection Code  
F.1 Bro SumStats Mechanism Code for Packet-based Spam Identifications  
 
@load base/frameworks/sumstats 
## Networks that are considered "local": 
 const private_address_space: set[subnet] = {  
                10.0.0.0/8, 
                192.168.0.0/16, 
                172.16.0.0/12, 
                147.32.84.0/8, 
                100.64.0.0/10, 
                127.0.0.0/8, 
                [fe80::]/10, 
                [::1]/128, 
 } &redef; 
const local_nets: set[subnet] &redef; 
global spam_detect = open_log_file("spamhosts") &redef; 
 
event connection_attempt(c: connection) 
{ 
      # Make an observation! 
 # This observation is about the host attempting the connection. 
 if(c$id$resp_p == 25/tcp) { 
  SumStats::observe("SMTP conn",  
                   SumStats::Key($host=c$id$orig_h),  
   SumStats::Observation($num=1)); 
 } 
 if(c$id$orig_p == 25/tcp) { 
  SumStats::observe("SMTP conn",  
                   SumStats::Key($host=c$id$resp_h),  
   SumStats::Observation($num=1)); 
 } 
} 
 
event connection_established(c: connection) 
{ 
# Make an observation! 
# Each established connection counts as one so the observation is always 1. 
 if(c$id$resp_p == 25/tcp) {  
  SumStats::observe("SMTP conn",  
                   SumStats::Key($host=c$id$orig_h),  
   SumStats::Observation($num=1)); 
 } 
 if(c$id$orig_p == 25/tcp) {  
  SumStats::observe("SMTP conn",  
                   SumStats::Key($host=c$id$resp_h),  
   SumStats::Observation($num=1)); 
 } 
} 
 
event bro_done() 
{ 
} 
 
event bro_init() 
{ 
 Log::disable_stream(Conn::LOG); 
 # The reducer attaches to the "SMTP conn" observation stream 
 # and uses the summing calculation on the observations. 
 local r1 = SumStats::Reducer($stream="SMTP conn",  
   $apply=set(SumStats::SUM)); 
 # Create the final sumstat. 
 # $threshold_val.  The actual threshold itself is provided with 
 # $threshold. 
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 # Another callback is provided for when a key crosses the 
 # threshold. 
 SumStats::create([$name = " Detecting spam activities", 
                   $epoch = 10sec, 
                   $reducers = set(r1), 
                   # Provide a threshold. 
                   $threshold = 10.0, 
                   # Provide a callback to calculate a value from 
                   # the result 
                   # to check against the threshold field. 
                   $threshold_val(key: SumStats::Key, result: 
SumStats::Result) = 
                    { 
                    return result["SMTP conn"]$sum; 
                    }, 
                   # Provide a callback for when a key crosses 
                   # the threshold. 
     $threshold_crossed(key: SumStats::Key, result: 
SumStats::Result) = 
                   { 
   if (key$host in private_address_space) { 
                    print fmt("%s attempted %.0f or more connections",  
       key$host, result["SMTP conn"]$sum); 
                    print spam_detect, fmt( 
       "%s attempted %.0f or more connections",  
       key$host, result["SMTP conn"]$sum); 
   } 
 }]); 
} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F.2 Bro PH Code for IRC-bot Detection  
 
@load base/frameworks/notice 
@load base/frameworks/signatures/main 
@load base/protocols/irc 
@load policy/misc/stats 
@load-sigs ./ircattack.sig  
@load base/frameworks/packet-filter 
 
redef capture_filters = { ["filter_table"] = "" }; 
global print_logs = open_log_file ("print_log") &redef ; 
global filter : string = ""; 
 
#To read a file into a Bro table, two record types have to be defined: 
# This record contains the types and names of the columns that should constitute the 
table keys.   
#Our key record only contains the host IP 
type Idx: record { 
        ip: addr; 
}; 
 
#This record contains the types and names of the columns that should constitute the 
table values. 
type Val: record { 
        comment: string; 
}; 
# Create an empty table that should contain the suspicious data 
global suspicious: table[addr] of Val = table(); 
 
event update_filter () 
{ 
local ns = net_stats(); 
local filter_counter : count = 0; 
local pre_filter : string = "host 100.101.102.103"; 
 
# 2) convert suspicious table into filter format string 
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for ( ip in suspicious ) 
{ 
pre_filter += fmt (" or host %s " , ip ) ; 
++ filter_counter; 
} 
print "pre_filter is"; 
print pre_filter; 
 
# 3) packet filter framework read the filters 
if ( pre_filter != filter ) 
{ 
print " Filter has beed altered"; 
print " Perform Recompiling Filter"; 
captured_filter [filter_table] = pre_filter ; 
} 
else 
{ 
print " Filter has not beed altered"; 
} 
filter = copy ( pre_filter ) ; 
print print_logs , " number of susp hosts marked ; hosts in filter"; 
print print_logs , fmt (" %s; %s", |suspicious| , filter_counter); 
# to update the capture_filter from suspicious, but not to update the suspicious 
itself (since Reread is there) 
schedule 10 sec { update_filter () };  
flush_all () ; 
} 
 
event bro_init() &priority = 5 
 { 
#1) transfer + update flow suspicious ips into suspicious table 
Input::add_table([$source="/home/hashem-bro/b-irc/flowirc/suspicious_file.log", 
 $name="suspicious", $idx=Idx, $val=Val, $destination=suspicious, 
$mode=Input::REREAD]); 
        Input::remove("suspicious"); 
               schedule 5 sec { update_filter () }; 
set_buf(detailed_log, F); 
 set_buf(bot_log, F); 
 } 
 
global checkflag = 0; 
global ircbotdetect = open_log_file("ircbot_packet_hosts") &redef; 
global p_at_in : count = 0; 
global p_es_in : count = 0; 
 
module IrcBot; 
export { 
 global detailed_log = open_log_file("irc.detailed") &redef; 
 global bot_log = open_log_file("irc-bots") &redef; 
 global summary_interval = 1 min &redef; 
 global detailed_logging = T &redef; 
 global content_dir = "irc-bots" &redef; 
 global bot_nicks = 
  /^\[([^\]]+\|)+[0-9]{2,}]/  # [DEU|XP|L|00] 
  | /^\[[^ ]+\]([^ ]+\|)+([0-9a-zA-Z-]+)/ # [0]CHN|3436036 
[DEU][1]3G-QE 
  | /^DCOM[0-9]+$/   # DCOM7845 
  | /^\{[A-Z]+\}-[0-9]+/   # {XP}-5021040 
  | /^\[[0-9]+-[A-Z0-9]+\][a-z]+/  # [0058-X2]wpbnlgwf 
  | /^\[[a-zA-Z0-9]\]-[a-zA-Z0-9]+$/ # [SD]-743056826 
  | /^[a-z]+[A-Z]+-[0-9]{5,}$/ 
  | /^[A-Z]{3}-[0-9]{4}/   # ITD-1119 
  ; 
 global bot_cmds = 
  /(^| *)[.?#!][^ 
]{0,5}(scan|ndcass|download|cvar\.|execute|update|dcom|asc|scanall) / 
  | /(^| +\]\[ +)\* (ipscan|wormride)/ 
  | /(^| *)asn1/ 
  ; 
 global skip_msgs = 
  /.*AUTH .*/ 
  | /.*\*\*\* Your host is .*/ 
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  | /.*\*\*\* If you are having problems connecting .*/ 
  ; 
 redef enum Notice::Type += { 
  IrcBotServerFound, 
  IrcBotClientFound, 
 }; 
 type channel: record { 
name: string; 
passwords: set[string]; 
topic: string &default=""; 
topic_history: vector of string; 
 }; 
 type bot_client: record { 
host: addr; 
p: port; 
nick: string &default=""; 
user: string &default=""; 
realname: string &default=""; 
channels: table[string] of channel; 
servers: set[addr] &optional; 
first_seen: time; 
last_seen: time; 
 }; 
 type bot_server: record { 
host: addr; 
p: set[port]; 
clients: table[addr] of bot_client; 
global_users: string &default=""; 
passwords: set[string]; 
channels: table[string] of channel; 
first_seen: time; 
last_seen: time; 
 }; 
 type bot_conn: record { 
client: bot_client; 
server: bot_server; 
conn: connection; 
fd: file; 
ircx: bool &default=F; 
 }; 
# We keep three sets of clients/servers: 
#  (1) tables containing all IRC clients/servers 
#  (2) sets containing potential bot hosts 
#  (3) sets containing confirmend bot hosts 
# 
# Hosts are confirmed when a connection is established between 
# potential bot hosts. 
# 
# FIXME: (1) should really be moved into the general IRC script. 
 global expire_server: 
  function(t: table[addr] of bot_server, idx: addr): interval; 
 global expire_client: 
  function(t: table[addr] of bot_client, idx: addr): interval; 
 global servers: table[addr] of bot_server &write_expire=24 hrs 
  &expire_func=expire_server &persistent; 
 global clients: table[addr] of bot_client &write_expire=24 hrs 
  &expire_func=expire_client &persistent; 
 global potential_bot_clients: set[addr] &persistent; 
 global potential_bot_servers: set[addr] &persistent; 
 global confirmed_bot_clients: set[addr] &persistent; 
 global confirmed_bot_servers: set[addr] &persistent; 
# All IRC connections. 
 global conns: table[conn_id] of bot_conn &persistent; 
# Connections between confirmed hosts. 
 global bot_conns: set[conn_id] &persistent; 
# Helper functions for readable output. 
 global strset_to_str: function(s: set[string]) : string; 
 global portset_to_str: function(s: set[port]) : string; 
 global addrset_to_str: function(s: set[addr]) : string; 
} 
function strset_to_str(s: set[string]) : string 
{ 
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 if ( |s| == 0 ) 
  return "<none>"; 
 local r = ""; 
 for ( i in s ) 
 { 
  if ( r != "" ) 
   r = cat(r, ","); 
  r = cat(r, fmt("\"%s\"", i)); 
 } 
 return r; 
} 
function portset_to_str(s: set[port]) : string 
{ 
 if ( |s| == 0 ) 
  return "<none>"; 
 local r = ""; 
 for ( i in s ) 
 { 
  if ( r != "" ) 
   r = cat(r, ","); 
  r = cat(r, fmt("%d", i)); 
 } 
 return r; 
} 
function addrset_to_str(s: set[addr]) : string 
{ 
 if ( |s| == 0 ) 
  return "<none>"; 
 local r = ""; 
 for ( i in s ) 
 { 
  if ( r != "" ) 
   r = cat(r, ","); 
  r = cat(r, fmt("%s", i)); 
 } 
 return r; 
} 
function fmt_time(t: time) : string 
{ 
 return strftime("%y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S", t); 
} 
event print_bot_state() 
{ 
 local bot_summary_log = open_log_file("irc-bots.summary"); 
 disable_print_hook(bot_summary_log); 
 print bot_summary_log, "---------------------------"; 
 print bot_summary_log, strftime("%y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S", network_time()); 
 print bot_summary_log, "---------------------------"; 
 print bot_summary_log; 
 print bot_summary_log, "Known servers"; 
 for ( h in confirmed_bot_servers ) 
 { 
  local s = servers[h]; 
  print bot_summary_log, 
        fmt("    %s %s - clients: %d ports %s password(s) %s last-seen 
%s first-seen %s global-users %s", 
           "L", 
          s$host, |s$clients|, portset_to_str(s$p), 
          strset_to_str(s$passwords), 
          fmt_time(s$last_seen), fmt_time(s$first_seen), 
          s$global_users); 
  for ( name in s$channels ) 
  { 
   local ch = s$channels[name]; 
   print bot_summary_log, 
         fmt("        channel %s: topic \"%s\", password(s) %s", 
           ch$name, ch$topic, 
           strset_to_str(ch$passwords)); 
  } 
 } 
 print bot_summary_log, "\nKnown clients"; 
 for ( h in confirmed_bot_clients ) 
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 { 
  local c = clients[h]; 
  print bot_summary_log, 
        fmt("    %s %s - server(s) %s user %s nick %s realname %s last-
seen %s first-seen %s", 
           "L", h, 
          addrset_to_str(c$servers), 
          c$user, c$nick, c$realname, 
          fmt_time(c$last_seen), fmt_time(c$first_seen)); 
 } 
 close(bot_summary_log); 
 
 if ( summary_interval != 0 secs ) 
  schedule summary_interval { print_bot_state() }; 
} 
function do_log_force(c: connection, msg: string) 
{ 
 local id = c$id; 
 print bot_log, fmt("%.6f %s:%d > %s:%d %s %s", 
   network_time(), id$orig_h, id$orig_p, 
   id$resp_h, id$resp_p, c$addl, msg); 
} 
function do_log(c: connection, msg: string) 
{ 
 if ( c$id !in bot_conns ) 
  return; 
 
 do_log_force(c, msg); 
} 
function log_msg(c: connection, cmd: string, prefix: string, msg: string) 
{ 
 if ( skip_msgs in msg ) 
  return; 
 do_log(c, fmt("MSG command=%s prefix=%s msg=\"%s\"", cmd, prefix, msg)); 
} 
function update_timestamps(c: connection) : bot_conn 
{ 
 local conn = conns[c$id]; 
 conn$client$last_seen = network_time(); 
 conn$server$last_seen = network_time(); 
# To prevent the set of entries from premature expiration, 
# we need to make a write access (can't use read_expire as we 
# iterate over the entries on a regular basis). 
 clients[c$id$orig_h] = conn$client; 
 servers[c$id$resp_h] = conn$server; 
 return conn; 
} 
function add_server(c: connection) : bot_server 
{ 
 local s_h = c$id$resp_h; 
 if ( s_h in servers ) 
  return servers[s_h]; 
 local empty_table1: table[addr] of bot_client; 
 local empty_table2: table[string] of channel; 
 local empty_set: set[string]; 
 local empty_set2: set[port]; 
 local server = [$host=s_h, $p=empty_set2, $clients=empty_table1, 
       $channels=empty_table2, $passwords=empty_set, 
       $first_seen=network_time(), $last_seen=network_time()]; 
 servers[s_h] = server; 
 return server; 
} 
function add_client(c: connection) : bot_client 
{ 
 local c_h = c$id$orig_h; 
 if ( c_h in clients ) 
  return clients[c_h]; 
 local empty_table: table[string] of channel; 
 local empty_set: set[addr]; 
 local client = [$host=c_h, $p=c$id$resp_p, $servers=empty_set, 
       $channels=empty_table, $first_seen=network_time(), 
       $last_seen=network_time()]; 
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 clients[c_h] = client; 
 return client; 
} 
function check_bot_conn(c: connection) 
{ 
 if ( c$id in bot_conns ) 
  return; 
 local client = c$id$orig_h; 
 local server = c$id$resp_h; 
 if ( client !in potential_bot_clients || server !in potential_bot_servers ) 
  return; 
# New confirmed bot_conn. 
 add bot_conns[c$id]; 
 if ( server !in confirmed_bot_servers ) 
 { 
  NOTICE([$note=IrcBotServerFound, $src=server, $p=c$id$resp_p, $conn=c, 
    $msg=fmt("ircbot server found: %s:%d", server, 
$p=c$id$resp_p)]); 
  add confirmed_bot_servers[server]; 
 } 
 if ( client !in confirmed_bot_clients ) 
 { 
  NOTICE([$note=IrcBotClientFound, $src=client, $p=c$id$orig_p, $conn=c, 
    $msg=fmt("ircbot client found: %s:%d", client, 
$p=c$id$orig_p)]); 
  add confirmed_bot_clients[client]; 
 } 
} 
function get_conn(c: connection) : bot_conn 
{ 
 local conn: bot_conn; 
 if ( c$id in conns ) 
 { 
  check_bot_conn(c); 
  return update_timestamps(c); 
 } 
 local c_h = c$id$orig_h; 
 local s_h = c$id$resp_h; 
 local client : bot_client; 
 local server : bot_server; 
 if ( c_h in clients ) 
  client = clients[c_h]; 
 else 
  client = add_client(c); 
 if ( s_h in servers ) 
  server = servers[s_h]; 
 else 
  server = add_server(c); 
 server$clients[c_h] = client; 
 add server$p[c$id$resp_p]; 
 add client$servers[s_h]; 
 conn$server = server; 
 conn$client = client; 
 conn$conn = c; 
 conns[c$id] = conn; 
 update_timestamps(c); 
 return conn; 
} 
function expire_server(t: table[addr] of bot_server, idx: addr): interval 
{ 
 local server = t[idx]; 
 for ( c in server$clients ) 
 { 
  local client = server$clients[c]; 
  delete client$servers[idx]; 
 } 
 delete potential_bot_servers[idx]; 
 delete confirmed_bot_servers[idx]; 
 return 0secs; 
} 
function expire_client(t: table[addr] of bot_client, idx: addr): interval 
{ 
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 local client = t[idx]; 
 for ( s in client$servers ) 
  if ( s in servers ) 
   delete servers[s]$clients[idx]; 
 delete potential_bot_clients[idx]; 
 delete confirmed_bot_clients[idx]; 
 return 0secs; 
} 
function remove_connection(c: connection) 
{ 
 local conn = conns[c$id]; 
 delete conns[c$id]; 
 delete bot_conns[c$id]; 
} 
event connection_state_remove(c: connection) 
{ 
 if ( c$id !in conns ) 
  return; 
 remove_connection(c); 
} 
event irc_client(c: connection, is_orig: bool, prefix: string, data: string) 
{ 
 if ( detailed_logging ) 
  print detailed_log, fmt("%.6f %s > (%s) %s", network_time(), 
id_string(c$id), prefix, data); 
 local conn = get_conn(c); 
 if ( data == /^ *[iI][rR][cC][xX] *$/ ) 
  conn$ircx = T; 
} 
event irc_server(c: connection, is_orig: bool, prefix: string, data: string) 
{ 
 if ( detailed_logging ) 
  print detailed_log, fmt("%.6f %s < (%s) %s", network_time(), 
id_string(c$id), prefix, data); 
 local conn = get_conn(c); 
} 
event irc_user_message(c: connection, is_orig: bool, user: string, host: string, 
server: string, real_name: string) 
{ 
 local conn = get_conn(c); 
 conn$client$user = user; 
 conn$client$realname = real_name; 
 do_log(c, fmt("USER user=%s host=%s server=%s real_name=%s", user, host, 
server, real_name)); 
} 
function get_channel(conn: bot_conn, channel: string) : channel 
{ 
 if ( channel in conn$server$channels ) 
  return conn$server$channels[channel]; 
 else 
 { 
  local empty_set: set[string]; 
  local empty_vec: vector of string; 
  local ch = [$name=channel, $passwords=empty_set, 
$topic_history=empty_vec]; 
  conn$server$channels[ch$name] = ch; 
  return ch; 
 } 
} 
event irc_join_message(c: connection, is_orig: bool, info_list: irc_join_list) 
{ 
 local conn = get_conn(c); 
 for ( i in info_list ) 
 { 
  local ch = get_channel(conn, i$channel); 
  if ( i$password != "" ) 
   add ch$passwords[i$password]; 
  conn$client$channels[ch$name] = ch; 
  do_log(c, fmt("JOIN channel=%s password=%s", i$channel, i$password)); 
 } 
} 
global urls: set[string] &read_expire = 7 days &persistent; 
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event http_request(c: connection, method: string, original_URI: string, 
  unescaped_URI: string, version: string) 
{ 
 if ( original_URI in urls ) 
  do_log_force(c, fmt("Request for URL %s", original_URI)); 
} 
event irc_channel_topic(c: connection, is_orig: bool, channel: string, topic: string) 
{ 
 if ( bot_cmds in topic ) 
 { 
  do_log_force(c, fmt("Matching TOPIC %s", topic)); 
  add potential_bot_servers[c$id$resp_h]; 
 } 
 local conn = get_conn(c); 
 local ch = get_channel(conn, channel); 
 ch$topic_history[|ch$topic_history| + 1] = ch$topic; 
 ch$topic = topic; 
 if ( c$id in bot_conns ) 
 { 
  do_log(c, fmt("TOPIC channel=%s topic=\"%s\"", channel, topic)); 
  local s = split(topic, / /); 
  for ( i in s ) 
  { 
   local w = s[i]; 
   if ( w == /[a-zA-Z]+:\/\/.*/ ) 
   { 
    add urls[w]; 
    do_log(c, fmt("URL channel=%s url=\"%s\"", 
       channel, w)); 
   } 
  } 
 } 
} 
event irc_nick_message(c: connection, is_orig: bool, who: string, newnick: string) 
{ 
 if ( bot_nicks in newnick ) 
 { 
  do_log_force(c, fmt("Matching NICK %s", newnick)); 
  add potential_bot_clients[c$id$orig_h]; 
 } 
 local conn = get_conn(c); 
 conn$client$nick = newnick; 
 do_log(c, fmt("NICK who=%s nick=%s", who, newnick)); 
} 
event irc_password_message(c: connection, is_orig: bool, password: string) 
{ 
 local conn = get_conn(c); 
 add conn$server$passwords[password]; 
 do_log(c, fmt("PASS password=%s", password)); 
} 
event irc_privmsg_message(c: connection, is_orig: bool, source: string, target: 
string, 
  message: string) 
{ 
 log_msg(c, "privmsg", source, fmt("->%s %s", target, message)); 
} 
event irc_notice_message(c: connection, is_orig: bool, source: string,  
  target: string, message: string) 
{ 
 log_msg(c, "notice", source, fmt("->%s %s", target, message)); 
} 
event irc_global_users(c: connection, is_orig: bool, prefix: string, msg: string) 
{ 
 local conn = get_conn(c); 
# Better would be to parse the message to extract the counts. 
 conn$server$global_users = msg; 
 log_msg(c, "globalusers", prefix, msg); 
} 
 
event Input::end_of_data(name: string, source: string) { 
for(ip in suspicious) { 
  #print ip; 
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 } 
} 
 
event bro_done() 
{ 
} 
event bro_init() &priority = -5 
{ 
 if ( summary_interval != 0 secs ) 
  schedule summary_interval { print_bot_state() }; 
Log::disable_stream(Conn::LOG); 
Log::disable_stream(HTTP::LOG); 
Log::disable_stream(Files::LOG); 
} 
 
 
F.3 Sample of Snort Rules for Botnet Detection 
 
alert udp $HOME_NET 1024:65535 -> $EXTERNAL_NET 1024:65535 (msg:"E7[rb] BOTHUNTER 
Storm(Peacomm) Peer Coordination Event [SEARCH RESULT]"; content:"|E311|"; depth:5; 
rawbytes; pcre:"/[0-9]+\.mpg\;size\=[0-9]+/x"; rawbytes; classtype:bad-unknown; 
sid:9910013; rev:99;) 
 
alert udp $HOME_NET 1024:65535 -> $EXTERNAL_NET 1024:65535 (msg:"E7[rb] BOTHUNTER 
Storm Worm Peer Coordination Event [PUBLISH]"; content:"|E313|"; depth:5; rawbytes; 
pcre:"/[0-9]+\.mpg\;size\=[0-9]+/x"; rawbytes; classtype:bad-unknown; sid:9910011; 
rev:99;) 
  
